Abstract-We compare the twelve-month default probability among subprime borrowers differing only in the number of months before their first lump-sum property tax payment, after which time they may be exposed to reduced liquidity. We show that borrowers with an earlier property tax billwithin three months of origination-have 2% to 6% higher first-year default rates than borrowers facing their first property tax bill ten to twelve months after origination. Lump-sum property tax payments appear to produce a persistent state of low liquidity, the length of which raises the likelihood of default. These results are about one-third the effect size of a transition from 10% positive to 20% negative equity found in the literature. This paper provides causal evidence that liquidity constraints are important predictors of mortgage default.
I. Introduction
H IGH rates of early payment default (EPD) among subprime mortgages, which is when a borrower defaults in the first year of mortgage origination, triggered large financial losses among investors and contributed to the largest financial crisis since the Great Depression (Longstaff, 2010; Mayer, Pence, & Sherlund, 2009; Haughwout, Peach, & Tracy, 2008) . Some have argued that strategic default explains the high rates of EPD as falling housing prices left households with negative equity and created financial incentives to default, even though they may have been able to pay. Others have argued that subprime borrowers were duped by predatory lenders into originating unaffordable mortgages. Another hypothesis-double trigger-suggests that the combination of low or negative equity and illiquidity due to life events like job loss, illness, or divorce limits a household's ability to make mortgage payments. Establishing and quantifying an independent causal role for illiquidity in mortgage default is essential to distinguishing strategic default, where liquidity plays no role, from the double-trigger hypothesis, where liquidity has a role. Distinguishing between these views is also essential for the design of loan modification and renegotiation policies.
Previous work has faced challenges in establishing an independent, causal role for liquidity in default because prior measures of illiquidity are likely correlated with unobserved factors that predict strategic default regardless of borrowers' illiquidity. 1 Because there are no nationally representative data sets that include both loan-level mortgage characteristics and information on shocks to a borrower's liquidity, a common strategy found in the literature is to use aggregate proxies for liquidity differences among borrowers, such as the unemployment or credit card delinquency rate in a borrower's county or the divorce rate in a borrower's state.
There are at least three problems with this approach. First, aggregate proxies like unemployment rates and credit card delinquency rates are endogenous to unobserved determinants of default, such as borrower-specific default costs or expectations of capital gains. For example, borrowers in high-unemployment counties may be more likely to default because they expect lower future capital gains than borrowers in counties with low unemployment. Thus, higher default rates in high-unemployment counties may also provide evidence consistent with strategic default motives. Second, assigning aggregate proxies to individual loans introduces classical measurement error, which attenuates our understanding of how illiquidity contributes to mortgage default. 2 For example, Gyourko and Tracy (2013) provide estimates of the extent to which using aggregate unemployment understates the effect of unemployment on default.
Third, when available, loan-level proxies for liquidity differences among borrowers, such as credit card utilization rates, are also likely to be endogenous to borrower characteristics (Elul et al., 2010) . 3 Specifically, borrowers with higher discount rates may also have higher credit card utilization and thus value future capital gains less, which may lead to default, regardless of borrowers' illiquidity. Again, observing higher default rates among borrowers with high credit card utilization rates might even be consistent with strategic default.
To provide evidence that liquidity problems play an independent, causal role in EPD, we apply the novel idea of exploiting property tax due dates for their role in stressing borrowers' liquidity. When borrowers do not have escrow accounts, the first property tax due date after origination is an event likely to stress liquidity by the higher expenses. Because property tax due dates vary by state and sometimes by county, differences in borrowers' loan origination dates within a state or county lead to plausibly exogenous variation in liquidity conditions. Importantly, we argue that such variation is orthogonal to unobserved determinants of strategic default.
More specifically, annual property tax payments represent a substantial financial obligation. In 2007, among housing units with mortgages, the median annual property tax payment was $2,099, which was 140% of the median monthly housing cost and 2.9% of the median annual household income. 4 As Cabral and Hoxby (2010) discussed, property tax bills are very salient to homeowners without escrow accounts and large enough that many must either save or increase credit card borrowing to pay these bills. Indeed, in 2007, according to the Survey of Consumer Finances, the median homeowner with a mortgage held just over $6,100 in liquid assets; roughly 40% held less than $2,099. Thus, property tax payments must reduce liquidity via a decrease in cash on hand or an increase in debt commitments, if only for a short time. 5 Using a sample of subprime home purchase loans originated between 2005 and 2007, we examine the one-year performance of each loan. Following the parsimonious approach in Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2008) , we compare twelve-month delinquency and default rates among loans that vary exogenously in the length of their exposure to a tax-induced liquidity reduction. We show that borrowers facing their first property tax bill earlier-in the first three months after origination-have a 2% to 6% higher EPD rate than borrowers facing their first tax bill later-ten to twelve months after origination. Our research design allows for the interpretation of this estimated effect size as compelling evidence that liquidity constraints are quantitatively important independent predictors of mortgage default. The magnitude of this effect is about one-third the effect size of a reduction in equity from 10% to negative 20% (Elul et al., 2010) .
We argue that our evidence is most consistent with the first property tax bill producing a prolonged and persistent period of reduced liquidity that makes borrowers more likely to default after their first tax due date than before. This period of reduced liquidity has two components. First, a property tax bill may be large enough to cause delinquency and default by itself. Survey evidence from 2006 suggests that property tax liabilities were the proximate cause of as much as 12% 4 U.S. Census Bureau, 2007 American Community Survey. These figures likely underestimate the annual financial obligation among subprime mortgage holders, but may overstate the size of an individual tax bill in states with semiannual installments. 5 The disclosures occurring under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) ought to make property taxes known and salient to all borrowers at closing. A lack of disclosures, however, could potentially make borrowers unaware of property tax due dates or the likely size of their property tax bill. of subprime mortgage delinquencies. 6 Second, unless borrowers are able to quickly increase cash on hand or decrease debt commitments following a property tax payment, borrowers paying property taxes earlier in their first year after mortgage origination may spend more time in that year with reduced liquidity. If reduced liquidity makes borrowers more susceptible to delinquency or default in response to income or expenditure shocks, borrowers who are more exposed to lower liquidity during the first year will likely have higher delinquency and default rates than those less exposed to reduced liquidity during the first year after origination.
Furthermore, placebo regressions show that the timing of the first property tax due date does not predict delinquency or default among subprime loans that seemingly have escrow accounts. Because these borrowers pay their property taxes together with their mortgage payments in twelve smaller monthly installments using a property tax escrow account, they make no direct outlay at the property tax due date. Consistent with the property tax due date leading to no liquidity reduction, we find no relationship between the length of exposure and missed mortgage payments. 7 In the next section, we discuss the property tax remittance process in the United States and how property tax due dates reduce the liquidity of borrowers without escrow accounts. In section III, we illustrate how we exploit features of the remittance process to obtain plausibly exogenous variation in liquidity conditions and present our estimating equation. We also describe the two loan-level data sets we use and the samples we construct. Our results are in section IV. Section V summarizes and concludes.
II. Property Tax Due Dates, Liquidity, and Default
Whether a borrower's liquidity is lower after a property tax due date than before depends on whether the borrower uses an escrow account to pay property taxes. 8 A borrower who uses an escrow account is obligated to make fixed monthly payments into a third-party bank account throughout the year. 9 The third party, typically a mortgage servicer, ensures that the money in the account is used to pay property taxes when they are due. Because an escrowed borrower continues to make the same monthly payments before and after a due date, all else equal, the borrower has the same amount of cash on hand and the same level of debt before and after the property tax due date. Thus, we expect that a borrower with 6 See table 4 in "Partnership Lessons and Results: Three Year Final Report" (p. 31) in Home Ownership Preservation Initiative (July 17, 2006) , www.nhschicago.org/downloads/82HOPI3YearReport_Jul17-06.pdf. 7 In Section IIIC, we discuss how the use of differences in the size of the tax bill to further identify liquidity effects is likely subject to substantial selection bias. 8 The use of an escrow account does not affect the amount of property taxes that a borrower is obligated to pay. 9 A borrower ensures an adequate cushion (enough money in the account to pay the tax bill on the due date) over the course of the year by making an initial deposit into the escrow account at closing (Anderson & Dokko, 2009 ). an escrow account will have the same liquidity before and after a property tax due date.
A borrower who does not use an escrow account has lower liquidity after the due date than before. This reduction occurs regardless of whether the borrower pays property taxes on time and regardless of whether a borrower saved in anticipation of paying property taxes. 10 A borrower who does not pay the tax bill by the due date immediately incurs delinquency penalties and accrues interest charges at a typical 18% annual rate (Anderson & Miller, 2015) . This increase in debt makes the borrower's liquidity lower after the due date than before. Similarly, a borrower making a timely property tax payment will use cash or other debt, each of which reduces liquidity. If the borrower uses cash, then cash on hand is lower after the due date than before. A borrower who uses debt (e.g., via delinquency on other bills, including a mortgage or by 10 Although this assumes that the tax bill is large enough that it is impossible to finance it entirely through a decrease in consumption expenditures that leaves cash on hand and debt commitments unchanged, we believe this characterization is justified (see Cabral & Hoxby, 2010) . using a credit card) has higher debt commitments after the due date. 11 For nonescrowed borrowers, the effect, if any, of this postdue-date liquidity reduction on mortgage delinquency and default may be immediate or delayed and, in terms of duration, be temporary or persistent. Figures 1 and 2 show a range of monthly and cumulative mortgage delinquency rates before and after property tax due dates if this effect were (a) immediate and temporary, (b) immediate and persistent, (c) delayed and temporary, or (d) delayed and persistent. Each figure assumes there are two groups of otherwise identical borrowers originating loans at the same time: borrowers with an early due date, who face longer exposure to the liquidity reduction, and borrowers with a late due date, who face shorter exposure times. The vertical lines mark the time of the due date in the charts on the left. We assume that the treatment effect of the liquidity reduction is the same for each borrower type, and the two groups of borrowers differ 11 As an example of households optimizing across different sources of debt, Cohen-Cole and Morse (2010) provide evidence that households become delinquent on their mortgage to avoid credit card delinquency. only in their exposure to the liquidity reduction. Each panel of figures 1 and 2 shows the cumulative delinquency rate and the (monthly) probability of default, depending on whether the treatment effect is immediate or delayed and whether it is temporary or persistent. Figure 1A shows an immediate and temporary effect of a liquidity reduction on default. For the loans with an early due date and a longer exposure, the monthly delinquency rate (the right panel), increases immediately after the early property tax due date and then returns immediately to its baseline rate. This would be a plausible outcome if, for example, borrowers financed their property tax payments by becoming delinquent on their mortgages. The effect is temporary, so property tax due dates predict the monthly delinquency rate only in the month immediately after taxes were due. The left side of the figure shows the cumulative delinquency rate (i.e., the share of borrowers who have ever been delinquent). The slope of this cumulative percentage increases at the due date, which is marked by the vertical lines, and then returns to its baseline level. Because the temporary jump in delinquency rates occurs later for borrowers with later due dates, the cumulative default rate for long-exposure borrowers is higher only temporarily before the cumulative default percentages subsequently converge.
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Similarly, figure 1B shows an immediate effect, but this effect is persistent. This would occur if, for example, lower levels of cash on hand (or both) higher debt levels after the due date make borrowers relatively more likely to become delinquent in response to income and expenditure shocks, such as unemployment, furlough days, and health problems occurring after the due date. In figure 1B , the cumulative default rate of the borrowers with early due dates increases at the time of the due date, and while the two percentages may eventually converge, the cumulative default rate of those with the early due date remains higher for the duration of the observation period.
Turning to delayed effects, figure 2A shows a liquidity reduction with a delayed and temporary effect on mortgage default. This would occur if the less cash on hand or higher debt after the due date creates temporary financial pressures that are initially minimal but build to culminate in an increase in mortgage delinquency. Such an effect may be temporary if, for example, borrowers finance the property tax payment with debt and there is a lag between incurring that debt and the obligation to service that debt. As in the immediate but temporary case in figure 1A , figure 2A shows an initial divergence in cumulative default percentage across the groups and a subsequent convergence. Figure 2B shows a liquidity reduction with a delayed and persistent effect on mortgage delinquency. One might expect to see this if the financial pressures triggered by the due date initially present no problems but then build and persist for an extended time after the due date. As in figure 1B , borrowers are more likely to default after the due date than before if they become more sensitive to income and expenditure shocks after the due date (when they have lower liquidity). As before, borrowers' delinquency rates remain higher for many months after the due date, and the cumulative delinquency percentages of the two groups do not converge within the displayed time frame.
In sum, for borrowers using escrow accounts, we should find no causal effect of property tax due dates on mortgage delinquency and default. For borrowers who do not use escrow accounts and for whom reductions in liquidity affect mortgage delinquency and default, we may find a causal effect of property tax due dates or, more precisely, the liquidity reduction they produce, on mortgage delinquency and default. Figures 1 and 2 help illustrate that the absence of an immediate increase in mortgage delinquency rates at the due date does not allow us to reject the existence of such a causal effect. Similarly, the lack of a difference in the cumulative default percentages of borrowers with longer and shorter exposures at a certain time does not allow us to reject that such causal effect exists. If borrowers with longer and shorter exposures are otherwise identical, a jump in delinquency immediately after a due date or a difference in the cumulative delinquency rates between the two types of borrowers at a certain time is affirmative evidence of a causal effect of liquidity reductions on mortgage delinquency. Further, the existence of sustained difference in the cumulative default percentages of long-exposed and short-exposed borrowers is affirmative evidence of that the liquidity reduction has a persistent causal effect.
III. Empirical Strategy and Data
In this section we define our key outcomes, describe our data, explain our identification strategy, and present our parsimonious econometric model.
A. Due Dates and Length of Exposure during the First Year
Our primary empirical approach is to compare first-year delinquency and default rates across groups of borrowers that differ in the timing of the first property tax due date. Property tax due dates vary between and within states. In 33 states, property tax due dates are uniform within the state; in the remaining states, there are within-state variations because counties or other local governments set their own due dates. 12 Table 1 shows that the between-state variation in property tax due dates spans most calendar months as every month except July has at least one state with a due date within it. The most common month for due dates is October, and there are fewer states with due dates in the summer. Table 1 also shows the variation in the calendar month of the first due date across the loans in our sample. The first property tax due date after origination offers the best opportunity to identify the timing and effect of an exogenous reduction in liquidity. It cleanly demarcates the months prior to the first bill, when a nonescrowed borrower is not exposed to a liquidity reduction, and the time after the first property tax bill, when a nonescrowed borrower is exposed to either a brief or persistent state of reduced liquidity. 13 If the liquidity reduction caused by the first tax payment persists for many months after the due date, subsequent property tax due dates do not cleanly demarcate the time before and after a liquidity reduction. 14 Subsequent due dates, however, may exacerbate the liquidity reduction associated with the first due date.
Together, the variation in the timing of tax due dates and loan originations generates between-loan variation in the exposure to the tax-induced liquidity reduction. Notably, loans differ in how "old" they are when property taxes are due, so the length of exposure is equal to twelve minus its age at the due date. Because all loans face a property tax due date within one year of origination, the minimum length of 902 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS exposure in the first year is zero months and the maximum length is eleven months. 15
B. Data and Sample
We construct two samples of subprime loans originated for home purchases between 2005 and 2007 using two sources of data: CoreLogic and LPS Applied Analytics. Importantly, both sources track the payment status of loans over time but differ in their respective strengths. CoreLogic has more coverage of securitized subprime loans and provides a more comprehensive measure of borrowers' combined loan-tovalue (CLTV) ratios, an indicator of the creditworthiness of the borrower that affects delinquency and default. For these reasons, we use CoreLogic as the primary analysis sample. One weakness is that the CoreLogic data do not include an indicator for whether a loan has an escrow account. 16 For this, we turn to the LPS data, which provide an escrow indicator, albeit a noisy one (as we discuss later). LPS data provide coverage of subprime loans held in the portfolios of financial institutions but are limited in their coverage of securitized subprime loans relative to CoreLogic.
Both CoreLogic and LPS provide underwriting information on additional borrower and loan characteristics, such as the borrower's FICO score, an indicator for whether the borrower fully documented his or her income, and, for about 60% of the observations, the borrower's stated debt-toincome (DTI) ratio at the time of origination. 17 Both sources of data also include limited information on loan characteristics that may pose risks to the borrower: the initial contract interest rate, an indicator for whether the mortgage has an adjustable rate, and an indicator for whether there is a prepayment penalty. For each loan, we know the month and year in which loans are originated.
The payment status variables track on a monthly basis whether a loan is current; thirty, sixty, or ninety days delinquent; or in foreclosure, which corresponds to whether a borrower has missed zero, one, two, three, or at least four consecutive payments, respectively. Note that this monthly indicator for foreclosure roughly identifies when the foreclosure process starts, not when it ends, which has historically ranged between eight and twelve months from after the borrower stops making payments (see Cutts & Merrill, 15 We set the length of exposure to 0 when, in a state with an annual due date, a loan originates in the month that taxes are due. In this case, we assume that the previous owner, as legally required, remits the tax bill before the sale, and thus the new owner does not pay property taxes for a full year. 16 In theory, one could infer whether a loan's monthly payment includes an escrow payment by ascertaining whether a loan's total monthly payment amount, which includes any payment into escrow accounts for insurance and taxes, is larger than a loan's principal and interest payments. However, despite our attempts at inferring escrow status through a variety of combinations, we are unable to infer the existence of an escrow account because the fields indicating monthly payments for principal and interest amounts can be missing for upward of 80% of the loans. 17 This variable is missing for so many observations because CoreLogic and LPS do not require servicers to submit this information to the database. Because it is missing, we do not include it in our main analysis.
2009). 18 As the outcomes of interest in much of our analysis, we construct four one-year, cumulative delinquency and default rates that correspond to the number of consecutive missed payments using these monthly payment indicators.
The loan's age at the property tax due date, and thus the loan's maximum potential length of first-year exposure, is constructed by combining CoreLogic's data with information on property tax due dates, which we obtained from the 2008 U.S. Master Property Tax Guide, Internet resources, and phone or e-mail contact with property tax-collecting government officials. Due dates do not vary over time within a state or county. 19 Appendix table lists the payment installments by state, which we combine with a loan's "birthday" to calculate the loan's age, measured in months, at the time property taxes are first due and the length of exposure.
In order to present evidence consistent with our identifying assumption that this exposure length is orthogonal to other confounding liquidity shocks, we use data from several other sources. First, we obtain county median property tax amounts relative to county median income from the 2005 American Community Survey (for calendar year 2004). Second, we calculate first-year house price appreciation rates using CoreLogic's postal codes code and state house price indexes. Following Foote et al. (2008) , we use these house price indexes and the CLTV ratio at origination to also construct a mark-to-market measure of housing equity at the time of the first property tax due date. We use county-level unemployment data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to calculate the change in the unemployment rate a borrower experiences between loan origination and the due date and the change between the due date and the end of the first year.
The loans in both analysis samples were originated in forty states (including the District of Columbia) identified in appendix table. We analyze these states because property tax due dates are uniform within either the state or county, which facilitates a merge with the CoreLogic and LPS data, where the available geographic identifiers include only state and postal code. The ten excluded states have property tax due dates that vary at the level of the municipality or school district, which are smaller geographic units than the postal code, making it impossible to merge with the loan-level data sets.
On a final note, to minimize the computation burden, we conduct most of our analysis on 20% and 10% random samples of the CoreLogic and LPS data, respectively. This leaves us with 268,999 loans from CoreLogic and 55,784 loans from LPS. The data set is collapsed into origination month-origination year-state observations. Only states with uniform dates are included. Estimates control for state and calendar month fixed effects. The F-statistic is from a test of whether the coefficients are jointly equal to 0. Statistically significant from 0 at the *10% level, two-tailed test; **5% level, two-tailed test; ***1% level, two-tailed test.
Source: CoreLogic. Statistics computed from 20% random sample of subprime purchase loans originated between 2005 and 2007 in forty states. Loan characteristics in the first column are averages estimated at origination. Columns 2 to 4 and 6 to 8 report the difference with respect to columns 1 and 4, respectively. Back-end DTI is the mortgage payment (including any escrowed insurance and taxes), credit card debt, car loans, education loans, and other debts divided by income. The back-end DTI variable is missing for 60% of observations because it was either not recorded by the lender or not reported by the servicer. In some cases, this variable is based on stated income rather than verified income. See text for additional details.
Source: CoreLogic and authors' compilation of tax due dates.
C. Identification
Our empirical approach relies on the identifying assumption that borrowers' maximum length of exposure to reduced liquidity is as good as random. In other words, our empirical approach requires that loan and borrower characteristics associated with borrowers' incentives for strategic default and ability to pay the mortgage-whether determined at or after origination-be orthogonal to treatment group assignment (Holland, 1986; Rubin, 1986) .
We provide evidence to support this identifying assumption in tables 2, 3, and 4. First, to rule out the possibility that some savvy borrowers are strategically timing the purchase of their homes, we compare select origination characteristics of loans that are taken out close to and far away from property tax due dates. Table 2 presents limited evidence that individuals time their loan originations to fall after due dates or that their risk characteristics, as measured by their FICO and CLTV, differ depending on the timing of loan origination relative to the due date. The set of results in the rows labeled "None" to "More than four months" show how a particular loan characteristic differs for loans originating zero to four months before or after a property tax due date relative to those originating more than four months from a property tax due date. For example, looking at the average FICO score, we find very little variation among loans originating close to or far away from a property tax due date. And indeed, for each of these characteristics, because we do not find meaningful differences, we do not find sufficient evidence to conclude that the strategic timing of loan origination is likely to be an important driver of our results. Loan characteristics in the first column are averages estimated at origination. Columns 2 to 4 and 6 to 8 report difference with respect to columns 1 and 4, respectively. The number of of installments in the number of times per year property tax payments are due. Property taxes and income are measured at the county level. The median property tax bill is the median annual property tax divided by the number of installments.
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Source: CoreLogic, authors' compilation of tax due dates, and 2005 American Community Survey.
In table 3, we further explore whether loans' observable characteristics differ depending on how long they are exposed to the liquidity reduction. We first divide loans into four mutually exclusive categories corresponding to differing lengths of exposure. We do this because it provides a convenient way to summarize data and enables us to look at groups that are as balanced as possible in the number of states that are covered. In the top row of table 3, the number of states covered in each category is 40 among the loans with the most exposure but drops to 25 for the loans with the least exposure.
In table 3, we also show how between-treatment group differences arise because the maximum age at the due date varies by state, and thus the composition of states changes across treatment groups. For example, in Florida, because property taxes are due once a year, a loan may be twelve months old before its first property tax due date; the length of exposure may be as short as zero months and as long as eleven months. In California, semiannual due dates imply that the treatment groups with lengths of exposure between zero and two or three and five months contain no loans from California. This is why, in table 3A, with the exception of the CLTV ratio at origination, loan and borrower characteristics vary somewhat across treatment groups.
However, as seen in panel B, after we adjust for state, origination year, and the calendar month of the due date, these between-group differences in average characteristics become much smaller. Notably, our rough proxies for the liquidity of the borrower at origination, which include FICO, CLTV, and the initial interest rate, do not differ much across the treatment groups, suggesting that perhaps the unobserved trade-offs borrowers make with points, fees, and down payments might not differ as well. State fixed effects, by controlling for time-invariant between-state differences in borrower characteristics, eliminate the prior differences in group means caused by between-treatment group differences in the composition of states. Origination year fixed effects are also included in the regression adjustment to control for time trends that may be correlated with the composition of states. Fixed effects for the calendar month of the due date also help control for the differing composition of states. We note that the differences in these characteristics across the treatment groups are economically small but jointly statistically different as the large number of loans in our sample leads to very precise inferences. But because the between-group differences in these adjusted characteristics are smaller and because they do not vary systematically across treatment groups, we conclude that conditional on state, origination year, and the month of the due date, there is no a priori reason to reject the identifying assumption that predetermined loan and borrower characteristics observed at origination are not correlated with loans' assignment to exposure lengths.
Similarly, in table 4, we find that after adjusting for state, year, and due date month fixed effects (panel B), loans with varying exposure lengths experience appear conditionally similar in the liquidity-related developments during the first year after origination. The size of the average annual property tax bill and the number of installments do not vary between the groups. Between-group differences in equity at the first property tax due-mark-to-market CLTV-are small, but, consistent with the amortization schedule, loans with later due dates and thus shorter exposure lengths have on average more equity at the due date than loans with early due dates and thus longer lengths of exposure. The average year-over-year change in unemployment is also similar across the treatment groups, as is the rate of house price appreciation in the first year. To be careful, we control for these variables in our regressions. That between-group differences are small and we control for these variables in our regressions gives us confidence that any estimated between-treatment group differences in delinquency and default rates are attributable not to differences in strategic default incentives but rather to differences in the lengths of exposure. We also note that in panel A, where we do not include controls for state fixed effects, the share of loans missing at least one payment in the first year is higher for the least-exposed loans, which works against us finding an effect of the liquidity reduction.
D. Estimation
Because we assume, as is consistent with our data, that for loans in a given state, the length of exposure is as good as random, we estimate the following parsimonious equation using a logit specification:
Beginning with the left-hand side of this estimating equation, we examine the performance of each loan for twelve months after origination and include only one observation for each loan. So D j i equals 1 if, at any time during the loan's first year, borrower i experiences outcome j and 0 otherwise. Thus, if a loan never experiences outcome j in its first year, D j i = 0. Note that the dependent variable does not take into account the timing of the outcome j within the first year or the number of times that outcome j occurs within the first year.
The four outcomes of interest for D j i include indicators for whether the borrower misses one, two, three, or four consecutive mortgage payments, leaving this person 30, 60, 90, or 120 days delinquent at any point during the first year. Later, we also consider whether these same outcomes occur during the first two years after origination. Following conventions in the mortgage default literature, we consider three or more months' delinquency during a loan's first year as EPD. If, within the first year after mortgage origination, a loan refinances prior to any experience of delinquency or default, we consider this borrower as not experiencing first-year delinquency or default (i.e., D j i = 0 for this borrower).
Turning to the right-hand-side variables, the three binary variables, Exposure t−k,i , divide the sample into four treatment groups according to their potential length of exposure to a tax-induced liquidity reduction. The variable equals 1 if a loan has a maximum potential exposure length of between t and k months. For example, if loan i's first property tax due date occurs at month 7, 8, or 9 since origination, the variable Exposure 3−5,i = 1 and the other two exposure-length variables equal 0. The omitted category represents loans with exposure lengths of nine, ten, and eleven months.
X i is a vector of predetermined loan and borrower characteristics observed at origination that address some reasons that are unrelated to property tax due dates but explain why default rates might be higher (or lower) for borrowers in any of the four treatment groups. These reasons include borrower-specific risk characteristics such as FICO or CLTV, declining underwriting standards that are proxied for by the loan's origination year, seasonal patterns in borrowers' credit-worthiness proxied for by the calendar month of the due date, and state-specific factors such as mortgage lending laws or macroeconomic conditions. X i also includes the sales price, a dummy indicating whether the loan was fully documented, an indicator equal to 1 if the loan is an adjustable rate mortgage, and the initial interest rate. 20 W i represents a vector of borrower characteristics that are not predetermined at origination but may potentially be correlated with a loan's exposure length and also affect a borrower's strategic incentives to default and their ability to pay the mortgage. These variables include housing equity at the first property tax due date, first-year house price appreciation, the size of the property tax burden, and the change in the unemployment rate during the first year. Although the estimates in table 4 provide confidence that strategic incentives are unlikely to confound our results, we include them in our analysis for completeness. The variable i is assumed to be a random error term.
Importantly, this parsimonious approach means that we do not need to control for loan age because at the end of their first year, all loans are one year old. Since a period of one year spans all calendar months, seasonal differences in default rates will not create between-treatment-group differences in default rates. 21 Equation (1) does not control for whether borrower i has an escrow account. For our results using data from LPS, this omission is not an issue. However, to interpret the results using the CoreLogic data, we need an additional assumption that property tax due dates do not affect whether subprime borrowers elect to open escrow accounts. In other words, we must assume that the fraction of borrowers with escrow accounts is the same across treatment groups in order to interpret the differences across groups as a liquidity effect rather than an effect due to differences in escrow rates. As we see in table 5, the evidence on the share of subprime loans with escrow accounts based on the LPS data supports this assumption. Here, we see that having an escrow does not seem to vary much by exposure to the liquidity reduction. Moreover, we see that, if anything, the share of loans with an escrow account declines with the length of exposure, which (all else equal) would weigh against finding that reduced liquidity lowers the likelihood of making payments. However, a downside to making this assumption is that it will lead 20 For states with uniform due dates, the combination of state and the month of first property tax due date is a perfect predictor of origination month. Thus, fixed effects for state, due date month, and origination month cannot all be included in the same regression. Regressions that include origination month rather than due date month fixed effects do not alter any conclusions. 21 There may be a case where an interaction between a loan's age at the due date and the calendar month of the due date affects default probabilities. However, any such interaction can be controlled for with an originationmonth dummy. to less precision in estimating our results in the CoreLogic sample. 22 There are three notable alternative empirical approaches that we choose not to explore. First, one could potentially exploit differences in the sizes of borrowers' property tax bills to generate between-borrower differences in the magnitudes of the post-due-date liquidity reductions. We believe this variation would be contaminated because homeowners sort into high or low tax jurisdictions based on tastes for public goods and their ability to pay their mortgages. Another option would be to compare borrowers with and without escrow accounts. Here, too, other factors, such as lenders' escrow requirements for borrowers with higher ex ante probabilities of default, would confound the interpretation. Indeed, as table 6 shows, seemingly nonescrowed loans appear to be positively selected relative to escrowed loans as their average FICO scores are higher and LTV ratios are lower. 23 Third, we believe that our empirical approach is preferable to the discrete-time hazard model approach that is common in the mortgage default literature. Estimating the discretetime duration hazard requires a data set that conditions on survival: each loan contributes one observation for each month that it survives (i.e., does not default). The treatment 22 We are cautious about how to interpret the estimates in table 5 because escrow status is measured with considerable noise, even among prime and FHA/VA loans. Indeed, a substantial share of FHA/VA loans, which by design have escrow accounts, are assigned a missing value in about one-third of cases.
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23 However, they may be more likely to have unobserved second liens that LPS is unable to account for. The sample consists of the first lien purchase loans originated by owner occupants. The loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is based on the reported first lien amount only.
Source: LPS Applied Analytics, 2005-2007. would be defined as the length of exposure and would be given by a sequence of dummy variables "turning on" for loan i in period t if it is exposed for e periods. However, with this approach, the duration dependence of the length of exposure is likely correlated with unobserved factors related to the probability of survival, making it difficult to estimate an unbiased relationship.
E. Interpretation
We now briefly review the possible types of effectstemporary or persistent, immediate or delayed-that we discussed in section II in the context of our estimating equation (1). In our main estimation, we allow one observation for each loan and limit the observation period to one year, ensuring each borrower twelve opportunities (months) to miss a payment. At the end of the year, outcomes can vary by the length of exposure if property tax due dates generate a persistent liquidity reduction or a temporary one that has not fully dissipated by year end. To distinguish between these two cases, we provide additional analyses using either augmented data (e.g., looking beyond one year) or complementary estimation strategies.
But if outcomes do not vary, it is not necessarily the case that the property tax due date has no liquidity-reducing effect. Instead, it may be that the liquidity reduction persists for only a short time, and thus property taxes affect only when the jump in delinquency occurs during the first year and not the overall level of default by year end. Figures 1A and 2A depict this case when this jump, which is indicative of a temporary effect, is immediate or delayed.
IV. Results
The results of estimating equation (1) Estimates are obtained from logit regression and calculating average marginal effects. Standard errors are obtained using delta method. Column 1 lists the average first-year default rate, for each outcome, among loans with nine to eleven months of exposure. Columns 2 to 4 and 6 to 8 list the percentage point marginal effects from logit estimation. The percent figures indicate the marginal effect expressed as a percent of the mean in columns 1 and 4. Control variables include fixed effects for state, origination year, calendar month of property tax due date, as well as sales price, borrower's FICO score, full documentation dummy, adjustable-rate dummy, initial interest rate, initial loan-to-value, mark-to-market loan-to-value ration at the due date, the ratio of county median property tax bill to county median income in 2004, first-year house price appreciation rate, and the first-year change in the unemployment rate. Coefficients in bold indicate statistical significance at the 1% level, two-tailed test.
Source: LPS Applied Analytics, 2005-2007, 10% random sample of subprime first lien purchase loans.
one of four different outcome variables: the twelve-month cumulative thirty-, sixty-, and ninety-day delinquency rate and the cumulative probability of a foreclosure start. These outcomes correspond to one, two, three, and at least four consecutive missed payments, respectively. For each outcome, column 1 lists the average twelve-month cumulative delinquency or default rate for loans with between nine and eleven months of exposure. Columns 2 through 4 display estimates of the three logit regression coefficients,β t−k , transformed into percentage point average marginal effects. The three columns display the average marginal effect, relative to loans with the longest exposure, of loans with lengths of exposure between six and eight months, three and five months, and zero and two months. The percent reported below the standard error in parentheses expresses the average marginal effect as a percent of the average delinquency or default rate for loans with nine to eleven months of exposure. First, starting with a group of subprime loans that have escrow accounts in the top panel of table 7, we find that longer exposures do not lead to higher rates of default. This result is not surprising given that a property tax due date is not associated with a liquidity reduction for this group. The bottom panel of table 7 presents the same estimates but for subprime borrowers without escrow accounts. Here, we obtain the result that loans with shorter exposure to the postdue-date liquidity reduction are less likely to default. We find that loans with the least exposure-zero to two monthsare 8% less likely to miss one payment during the first year. Because missing only one mortgage payment is relatively common-for example, if a borrower forgets to mail in the payment-and not necessarily indicative of a financial hardship, we turn to the results on more serious delinquency outcomes. As seen in rows 2 to 4, we find that the loans with the longest exposure are 9% to 10% more likely to miss two to four consecutive payments. Further, although we do not have enough power to statistically distinguish the size of the coefficients from each other, we find that, generally, β 0−2 <β 3−5 <β 6−8 < 0. We also note that the differences across treatment groups could be biased downward if the most exposed borrowers refinance in greater proportions in anticipation of low liquidity. 24 Turning to the results from CoreLogic in table 8, we similarly find that loans with less exposure are less likely to miss one or more mortgage payments during the first year. Focusing on the results in panel B where we include a more complete set of controls, loans with exposure lengths between six and eight months are about half a percentage point-or nearly 2%-less likely to experience a thirty-day delinquency than loans with the longest exposure. 25 For more serious delinquencies, we find that the least exposed loans are approximately 2% to 5% less likely to miss two, three, or four consecutive payments. 26 The reasons that the estimates in table 7 might be larger than in table 8 do not lead us to reject one set of results in favor of the other. Because the first set of results conditions on escrow status, we might reasonably expect the estimate 24 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this observation. 25 These control variables include sales price, FICO score at origination, indicator for full versus no or low documentation, indicator for adjustable rate mortgage, interest rate at origination, combined loan-to-value ratio at origination, mark-to-market combined loan-to-value ratio at the due date, first-year house price appreciation, the ratio of county median property tax bill to county median income in 2004, the one-year change in the unemployment rate (expressed as two variables marking the percentage point changes before and after the due date), and fixed effects for origination year, month of property tax due date, and state. 26 In an alternative specification, we enter the number of months of exposure into the logit regression as a continuous measure and find that one additional month of exposure increases the probability of a missed payment. These results are available on request. Estimates obtained from logit regression and calculating marginal average effects. Standard errors obtained using delta method. Estimates in bold indicate statistical significance at the 1% significance level, two-tailed test. Column 1 lists the average first-year default rate, for each outcome, among loans with nine to eleven months of exposure. Columns 2 to 4 list the percentage point marginal effects from logit estimation. The percent figure is the marginal effect expressed as a percentage of the mean in column 1. The limited set of control variables includes fixed effects for state, origination year, and calendar month of property tax due date. The full set of control variables includes these covariates, as well as sales price, borrower's FICO score, full documentation dummy, adjustable-rate dummy, initial interest rate, initial combined loan-to-value ratio, mark-to-market combined loan-to-value ratio at the due date, the ratio of county median property tax bill to county median income in 2004, first-year house price appreciation rate, and first-year change in the unemployment rate.
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Source: CoreLogic, 2005 CoreLogic, to 2007 to be more precisely estimated and less attenuated toward 0. Moreover, LPS includes subprime loans that are held in the portfolios of financial institutions in addition to those that are securitized, and these two types of loans may be from different distributions but are still important to study (Jiang, Nelson, & Vytlacil, 2010) . And the representativeness of subprime loans differs between LPS and CoreLogic, so it is important to turn to both sources of data for a fuller understanding of the market. We find the consistency of the result-that longer exposure to reduced liquidity leads to higher rates of default-across the two sources of data reassuring. We further argue that the results in tables 7 and 8 arise because tax due dates lead to a persistent liquidity reduction from which households cannot immediately recover. In other words, we interpret the higher occurrence of missed payments as evidence that borrowers with reduced liquidity are more likely to miss payments when they are hit with shocks to income or expenditures. 27 This interpretation about the mechanism by which loans with less exposure are also less likely to default is based on five sets of results. First, we find that the results extend to more serious delinquencies as well as the likelihood of missing one payment. If borrowers were able to quickly restore liquidity following a property tax due date, it seems less likely that we would find betweengroup differences in the rates of more serious delinquencies and EPD. Because we expect mortgage delinquencies motivated by consumption smoothing to be less serious, the results also rule out the possibility that only unconstrained borrowers missing only one payment for short-term consumption smoothing are driving the thirty-day delinquency 27 Precautionary savings behavior can produce results similar to those implied by liquidity constraints (Carroll, 2001 ). The P-value is from a test of whether the estimated marginal effect in column 2 is equal to that in column 1 against the alternative hypothesis that the estimate in column 2 is larger than in column 1.
Source: CoreLogic.
results. Table 9 presents additional evidence consistent with our interpretation. Column 1 shows the relationship between missed mortgage payments and the change in the unemployment rate between origination and the due date, while column 2 does this for the change in the unemployment rate and the end of the first year. A brief and temporary liquidity reduction would correspond to similarly sized coefficients in the two columns; that is, irrespective of when the unemployment rate rises, the corresponding probability of missed payments should be higher by the same amount. But instead we find that a one-unit increase in the county unemployment rate corresponds to a larger increase in the probability of missed payments if it occurs when liquidity is lower (i.e., after the due date) than when it is higher. Second, we turn to complementary results that exploit within-borrower variation in payment outcomes relative to the property tax due date. Specifically, we apply a difference- Standard errors are obtained using the delta method. Column 1 lists the average first-year default rate, for each outcome, among loans with age at due date between one and three months. Columns 2 to 4 list the percentage point marginal effects from logit estimation. The number to the right of each percentage point marginal effect is the marginal effect as a percentage of the mean in column 1. Control variables include sales price, borrower's FICO score, full versus no or low documentation dummy, indicator for adjustable rate mortgage, initial interest rate, initial combined loan-to-value ratio, mark-to-market combined loan-to-value ratio at due date, the ratio of county median property tax bill to county median income in 2004, two-year house price appreciation rate, and fixed effects for state, origination year, calendar month of property tax due date, and the two-year change in the unemployment rate. Result statistically significant from 0 at ***1%, **5%, *10%.
in-difference (DD) framework to compare the evolution of the cumulative thirty-day delinquency rate among loans with a due date in the second month after origination (treatment group) with that for loans with a due date in the tenth to twelfth month after origination (control group). 28 With the DD approach and this particular construction of the treatment and control groups, we are able to examine whether delinquency rates jump when the property tax is due, which would indicate an immediate effect, and whether the effect persists for up to nine months. We find that the jump in delinquency is small at the time of the due date, suggesting that the effect is delayed. Moreover, we find that the effect widens over time and persists (for nine months when the treatment and control groups are defined as before). 29 However, the DD approach is limited in being able to detect longer-term effects because all loans eventually get treated. Also, the observation window must be shortened as one widens the range of payment outcomes under consideration. 30 Another operational challenge is that adding loans to the control group beyond those in the example (e.g., including loans with due dates in months 3 to 9 after origination) also leads to trade-offs between the size of the 28 The estimating equation is Y it = τ t + T i + δ * T i * τ t + it , where Y it is the cumulative delinquency rate for borrower i in period t, τ t "turns on" in period 2 (or higher when either delayed or persistent effects are under consideration), and δ is the DD effect of the due date.
29 These results are available on request. 30 Moreover, one must confront important operational challenges in scaling up the DD framework to study additional outcomes and broaden the sample of loans. For example, to examine the occurrence of more than one consecutive missed payment as an outcome, we would need to change the treatment group to loans with a due date in the third, fourth, or fifth month after origination (corresponding to sixty/ninety-day delinquency and foreclosure starts, respectively) because it takes some time for such effects to occur and the DD strategy requires within-borrower variation in treated status over time. Estimating a DD effect for this outcome requires considering loans with a due date in the third month (or beyond) as the treatment group so that the outcome can be observed and so that there is within-borrower variation in treated status such that no borrower is treated in the "pre" period. Narrowing the observation window in this manner entails dropping loans with due dates in the first and second months because they do not offer any such within-borrower differences in treated status.
control group and the broadness of the window. So we turn to our third set of results where we extend the period of time during which we observe payment outcomes to two years after origination. The additional year exposes loans to additional periods of possible default risk and, for some loans, an impending interest rate reset at the end of the second year. Observing loans for two years provides additional scope to uncover whether the differences we observe in tables 7 and 8 dissipate. Instead, even after two years, as shown in table 10, we find that loans with more exposure are more likely to be delinquent and default than less exposed loans, which supports our view that the rate of default differs by exposure.
Fourth, the results in the top half of table 11 show that once a borrower misses payments, the least exposed are more likely to make up missed payments (in the first year). The regressions in columns 1 through 4 include only loans that have missed one to four payments. The first entry in column 4 shows that conditional on a borrower missing one payment, borrowers with the least exposed loans are 3.2 percentage points more likely to cure that delinquency than the most exposed borrowers. The results are similar for the probabilities of two and three missed payments, suggesting that longer exposure to a persistent liquidity reduction lowers the likelihood of making up missed payments. In other words, conditional on missing payments, a borrower experiencing an income shock, say, six months after origination, is more likely to make up the missed payments if he or she has yet to face a due date than if he or she already has. If borrowers were able to quickly restore their liquidity, we would not obtain the results in table 11. Further, the last two rows in the bottom half of table 11 show the fraction of loans that both remains in the sample and is current on payments after one and two years. Consistent with the results on making up missed payments in the first year, the least exposed borrowers are more likely to be current at twelve months than the most exposed. However, the differences are less pronounced at 24 months, which suggests that the likelihood of curing Control variables include sales price, borrower's FICO score, full versus no/low documentation dummy, indicator for adjustable rate mortgage, initial interest rate, initial combined loan-to-value ratio, mark-to-market combined loan-to-value ratio at due date, the ratio of county median property tax bill to county median income in 2004, house price appreciation, unemployment rate, and fixed effects for origination year, month of property tax due date, and state. Result statistically significatn from 0 at ***1%, **5%, *10%.
between the first and second years may evolve differently for the most and least exposed groups. 31 Fifth, ancillary evidence rules out that greater surprise about the property tax bill among the most exposed borrowers-who may be relatively new to homeownership at their first due date-causes higher rates of missed payments. We estimate equation (1) on a sample of refinance loans. Borrowers who refinance are, by definition, not firsttime homeowners and are thus less likely to be surprised by property taxes. If surprise alone explains the high default rate among long-exposed borrowers with subprime purchase loans, we would expect to find no difference in default rates for long-exposed and short-exposed refinance loans, where the borrowers are not surprised. Instead, we find results similar to our purchase loan results, consistent with surprise not playing a major role in our results. We also note that the disclosures occurring under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) ought to make property taxes known and salient to all borrowers at closing. Indeed, since the most exposed borrowers face their first due dates soon after being exposed to these disclosures, they ought to be less surprised than the least-exposed borrowers, which works against our interpreting our results as a "surprise" effect.
V. Summary and Conclusion
We use property tax due dates to identify arguably exogenous variation in reduced liquidity at the loan level. Such variation allows us to estimate the causal effect of a liquidity reduction on mortgage payment outcomes and EPD. Prior work has been unable to estimate the causal effects 31 Note that a borrower can miss a payment and thus be considered delinquent under the cumulative delinquency measure, but if he or she makes up these payments by the end of the second year, this person would be considered current at twelve months. of illiquidity on delinquency and default because available measures of between-loan differences in liquidity are endogenous.
Our results demonstrate that, looking across groups of loans with more and less exposure, loans facing a due date within one to three months after origination have about 2% to 6% higher first-year delinquency and default rates than loans that face a property tax due date ten to twelve months after origination. Based on the analysis in the paper, we interpret these results as arising because there is a delayed and persistent effect of due dates.
One way to interpret the size of these effects is to compare them with previous estimates of the effect of negative equity. The most exposed loans are exposed to reduced liquidity for three quarters longer than late-due loans and are 0.53 percentage points more likely to become sixty days delinquent during the first year. In contrast, the estimates in Elul et al. (2010) suggest that an increase in CLTV from 90 to 120 (i.e., moving from positive to negative equity) is associated with a 1.9 percentage point increase in the probability of loans becoming at least sixty days delinquent during a year. 32 Thus, the effect of three additional quarters of exposure to the post-due-date liquidity reduction is about one-third as large as the effect of a transition to negative equity.
To interpret the results with respect to the magnitude of the liquidity reduction associated with property taxes, consider a subprime household that faces lower liquidity after the property tax due date because they use their credit card to pay a property tax bill comprising 3% of their annual income. The back-end DTI ratio contains the minimum required monthly payment on credit card balances in its numerator. If the minimum payment is 2% of the balance, since borrowing to pay the tax bill increases the balance by 36% of monthly income, the household's DTI increases by 0.0072. Suppose there are two identical households with the above characteristics: one that pays property taxes at two months, the other at eleven months after origination. Assuming that each household had the average pre-due date DTI of 0.40, the household that pays its property tax bill at two months has an average monthly first-year DTI of 0.4066, while the household that pays at eleven months has an average monthly first-year DTI of 0.4012. 33 This corresponds to a 1.3% higher average first-year DTI for the most exposed household, which in turn is associated with a 2.6% increase in the probability of a first-year sixty-day delinquency, or an elasticity of approximately 2. 34 Our results suggest an important role for illiquidity in EPD and perhaps mortgage default more generally. These tax-induced liquidity reductions are much smaller in magnitude than the liquidity reductions researchers wish they could observe at the loan level, such as those produced by unemployment, health expenses, or divorce. Observing these larger shocks at the loan level might produce even larger loan-level estimates of the effect of reduced liquidity on delinquency and default. One caveat to our estimates is that they reflect the effect of idiosyncratic liquidity reductions because the variation in liquidity occurs at the loan level. If there were systemic or coordinated liquidity reductions occurring at once, such as if there were mass layoffs across many communities, one might expect to see a different response. Another caveat is that borrowers with prime loans may be less sensitive to liquidity reductions since they are generally less sensitive than subprime borrowers to income and expenditure shocks.
Demonstrating that illiquidity plays an important role in mortgage default has implications for loan renegotiation and modification policies. If illiquidity were not an important cause of default, temporary reductions in borrowers' payments would not prevent default, and lenders would find reducing principal more effective for reducing default. Because we find that illiquidity is an important predictor of default, our results suggest that temporary reductions in payments will help preserve liquidity and, for some borrowers, help avoid serious delinquency and default. In our specific application, our results suggest that temporary reductions in monthly payments (perhaps in the form of forbearance) for borrowers who face property taxes soon after origination would prevent at least some serious delinquency and default.
On its face, survey evidence that households prefer smooth payments of financial obligations to lump-sum payments makes it puzzling that escrow was so uncommon in the subprime mortgage market. Yet all else equal, the absence of an escrow account lowers borrowers' closing costs and monthly payments, which may be attractive to some borrowers, especially those who incorrectly interpret the lower closing costs and monthly payments as a reduction in the cost of borrowing. 35 Still, that we uncover that differences in the timing of anticipated payment obligations contributes to mortgage delinquency and default is suggestive of poor underwriting for some loans. That is, in principle, loans should not be underwritten such that small differences in the timing of anticipated increases in payment obligations affect the probability of default. That we find otherwise is consistent with poor underwriting standards (Demyanyk & Hemert, 2009) .
Our results also contribute to a broader discussion about why lenders might underwrite loans so poorly. Securitization may have led to poor screening incentives, or the absence of escrow accounts may have offered a way for lenders to exploit poorly informed borrowers by shrouding loan attributes to hide the full cost of homeownership (Gabaix & Laibson, 2006; Bond, Musto, & Yilmaz, 2009; Keys, et al., 2010) . This second explanation requires lenders to be able to make money in other ways-through more originations or higher refinance fees, for example-to compensate for the higher rates of delinquency and default. The incentives surrounding yield spread premiums charged by brokers may have also facilitated underwriting without escrow accounts (Burlingame & Jackson, 2007; Woodward & Hall, 2012) .
The lack of escrow accounts may have been peculiar to the dramatic rise in housing prices during 2000 to 2006. Once prices began to decline, some lenders, such as Washington Mutual (now JPMorgan Chase), began requiring escrow accounts on all new subprime loans. Thus, the lack of escrow accounts may also reflect the decisions of lenders and borrowers eager to bet on rising housing prices . 35 Stango and Zinman (2009) show that consumers have a tendency to systematically underestimate the cost of borrowing based on loan terms other than the interest rate. For a discussion of the features of household mortgage decisions, see Campbell (2006) .
